Abstract. We present two formulations of a model for nding equilibrium passengers and operators ows in a partially regulated transit system where bus operators are free to choose the routes where they o er public transport services. The transit fares are assumed xed and known. The model o ers a detailed representation of the transit system network and of the transit users behavior. Congestion e ects are also considered as a consequence of cars and buses operation over a common road network. Two algorithmic solution approaches are investigated.
Introduction.
In this paper we consider an urban public transport system served by buses that are individually owned and operated by small entrepreneurs under partially unregulated conditions. Given a set of lines where public transport can be o ered, private operators freely decide on which of these lines to run their buses such that their individual net bene t be maximized.
Depending on the number of buses operating on each line, the length of the route operated and the congestion experienced by the vehicles, a service frequency will result which in turn will in uence the demand on that line and therefore the operators bene ts.
If the number of buses in the system is large, as is the case in many developing countries, an important part of the congestion e ect will be induced by buses (in contrast with cars), thus a ecting their operating costs and that of the private cars using the same network infrastructure.
The problem we consider is that of nding the equilibrium state of the passengers-operators system. In the operators subsystem, the level of service is determined through the operators decisions with respect to the allocation of their vehicles to transit routes where the service is provided. The second subproblem consists in nding a bimodal equilibrium for private car and transit users; in the general case, this will include both mode-split and assignment. A solution is characterized by the eet size assigned to the operation of each line, the corresponding levels of service for both transit vehicles and private cars, and the equilibrium ows of transit passengers and private cars.
This model is a good representation of the present situation in cities in Chile in particular and in developing countries in general. In Santiago, the capital city of Chile, the daily demand for four million public transport trips is mainly satis ed by an eight thousand bus eet operated by small entrepreneurs, with an average of 1.5 vehicle per entrepreneur.
The model presented in this paper constitutes a natural extension of the developments obtained in the eld of network equilibrium and transit systems modelling. Actually, the transport users behavior is described through the use of a bimodal equilibrium based on the formulation proposed earlier by Florian and Spiess 9] . The representation of transit users choice behavior, with respect to the di erent transit services available in the transit network considered, is obtained by using a state-of-the-art transit assignment model, such as the onesdescribed by Spiess and Florian 19] or De Cea and Fern andez 4].
This approach departs from that taken by other authors who have proposed models which do not integrate those abovementioned methodological developments and consequently have made restrictive assumptions with respect to both the transit network representation and the transit users behavior. Thus Viton 20] 21] develops models based on a simpli ed representation of a corridor between a residential area and the downtown area; the two areas are connected by a limited-access arterial highway and the market considered is a duopoly involving a private and a public rm. Vehicle operating speeds are assumed independent of tra c ow. Ko cur and Hendrickson 12] propose a model of a simpli ed, continuous representation of the transit system, where transit service characteristics are considered homogeneous, invariant over space and independent of ow. Kanemoto 13] considers competitive railway rms competing on a radial, symmetric network.
More recently, Harker 11] has proposed an interesting model which extends Viton's work by introducing an explicit representation of the transit network services. In his representation, overlapping routes are not allowed, which constitutes an important limitation to the adequate representation of transit systems in developing countries, characterized by a large degree of overlapping between competing routes. Also, Harker's model does not consider interactions between agents on the network; operators strategy sets are disjoint, there is no representation of route competition between operators, and users reaction to changes in transit service frequencies are not taken into account.
Our model tries to alleviate some of these drawbacks. In particular, ridership is endogenously distributed among competing transit lines, rather than estimated through an inverse demand function which would practically be di cult to calibrate. Of course, such a detailed representation of the network topology and the users and operators behavior has required us, in the interest of computational tractability, to make certain approximations such as assuming unlimited in-vehicle capacities and steady-state operating conditions.
1. Notation and modelling assumptions.
Notation and basic relationships.
Let G = (N; A) denote a transportation network with node set N and link set A. The set of links represents city streets and the set of nodes represents intersections and centroids where trips originate or terminate. We assume that G serves as an infrastructure for both public (buses) and private (cars) transport modes. Most links in A will be simultaneously used by private cars and buses, and therefore congestion interactions will exist: Changes in car ows will in uence bus operating costs and service levels, and reciprocally. We will denote: W : set of network origin-destination pairs. : total number of buses in the system. 
As was explained previously, cars and buses simultaneously share the same infrastructure (city streets), and therefore their respective congestion functions are dependent on both car and bus ows. We assume that bus travel times and operating costs on link a will also be in uenced by the total number of passengers boarding on link a: 
1.2. Operators behavior.
In the case of the Santiago de Chile transit system, transit services are provided by private operators who constitute operational associations to provide a regular service on a given line l of L. As most of them are small entrepreneurs owning less than ve vehicles, they agree to a coordinated operation in order to o er some commercial frequency of service on that line.
Each operator considers the di erent transit lines as alternative business opportunities and allocates his vehicles such that his total pro t be maximized. Therefore those operators that own more than one vehicle consider each of them individually and perform a marginal cost analysis to allocate them to the most pro table line. This behavior will result, as has been observed, in a single owner operating vehicles on several distinct lines. No constraint in our model requires an operator to restrict his operations to a single line.
The pro tability of each transit line will be endogenously determined by the demand for its services, the vehicle operating cost, and capital costs. It is important to realize that congestion can a ect certain lines more that others, resulting in some lines being more expensive to operate than others. For example, lines going through the downtown area use heavily congested streets, resulting in low vehicle speeds, stop and go operation, and the need of a larger eet for providing a given service level (frequency). As a consequence, capital and operating costs will be larger.
Users equilibrium submodel.
We assume that car drivers and transit system users strive to minimize travel time (or \generalized" travel costs). Therefore, car drivers behave according to Wardrop's rst principle of tra c equilibrium (user optimization). Behavior of the transit user is determined by the choice of services provided over the transit network and their routing through the network will be numerically performed using a state-of-the-art transit assignment model, such as described in Spiess 18 In these assignment models a passenger waiting at a bus stop selects the rst incoming bus from a set of \at-tractive lines". More speci cally, assuming random bus arrivals (exponentially distributed headways), a user will choose the set of attractive lines through a minimization procedure whose objective is the expected transit time to his destination, de ned as the sum of walking, waiting and in-vehicle travel time, taking into account transfers. The models previously quoted di er only in the number of attractive lines that can be dealt with.
A bimodal mode choice/assignment equilibrium model such as that of Florian and Spiess 9] can be used to predict both transit passengers and private car ows, given a road network G(N;A), a transit network G(N;L), the transit eet size for each transit line l 2 L, a logit mode-split model and origin-destination matrix.
In this paper mode-split is considered xed; therefore two demand matrices are required, one for private car users (T) and the other for transit passengers (T). Even in the case of xed modal split, both classes of users interact signi cantly, due to congestion e ects on the common road network. Indeed trip choices by transit and car users will a ect equilibrium levels of service for all users.
It would not conceptually be di cult to include mode-split in our analysis; however this would unduly complicate the notation and hide the more salient features of our model.
Finally let us note that all strategy-based transit assignment models can be formulated as the search for a demand-feasible ow vector satisfying the variational inequality: C(B; F )(F ? F ) 0 8F 2 ? (7) where ? denotes the set of feasible user ow vectors and B a given eet size vector. Notwithstanding congestion induced by transit users, (7) reduces to a linear program.
Equilibrium conditions.
An equilibrium of the users-operators system is achieved when no player (bus operator, car user or transit passenger) can improve his objective through a unilateral change of strategy. In particular the following conditions will be ful lled at equilibrium: This global scheme represents a generalization of the classical Cournot-Nash equilibrium framework where, instead of two pro t-maximizing players, we consider two systems that must achieve an equilibrium among and within themselves. In the particular instance where the equilibrium state of each system corresponds to the global maximization of some objective function, then an overall equilibrium corresponds to a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the corresponding Cournot-Nash game.
An equilibrium will be identi ed as a set (F ; ' ) of multimodal equilibrium ows and associated pro t maximizing frequencies.
Transit market operation.
It is possible to make di erent assumptions with respect to the degree of regulation in the transit system. Full, free competitive conditions would be obtained if entry into the market were unrestricted and fares were determined from the sole interaction of supply and demand. Nevertheless some intermediate situations can be considered and modeled as well. In this paper it is assumed that the fare structure is exogenously provided. Even in this restricted setting, some interesting questions arise: Firstly, how many buses will be operating in the system? Then, how will they distribute on the transit network? The model presented in this paper addresses those two questions as a rst approximation to the solution of a more general model that will consider full free competitive conditions. Some alternative formulations, corresponding to intermediate market conditions, will be mentioned in the last section of the paper.
2. Operators equilibrium model formulation.
Bus operators equilibrium submodel.
Given that transit services are provided by a large number of individual operators who strive to maximize individual pro ts, and that they freely choose the lines where to run their buses, the equilibrium model can be formulated as an assignment-of-buses-to-lines problem. The question of interest is how to assign a given eet of buses to the set of potential lines L such that individual operators pro ts are indeed maximized.
According to our assumptions, an equilibrium will be achieved when no operator can improve his pro t by a unilateral change of line. Therefore at equilibrium, all lines served must produce the same pro t per vehicle and time unit, and this pro t must not be lower than the pro t that would be obtained by operating a vehicle on any of the unserved lines.
These conditions can be expressed analytically as follows:
where l denotes the net pro t obtained by a vehicle operating on line l and u represents the maximum equilibrium net revenue obtained, per vehicle and per time unit, on all served transit lines, at equilibrium. Under the assumptions made so far we propose two formulations for the problem. In the rst formulation the total number of buses in the system is xed and we want to determine their distribution on the potential lines of the transit network such that pro ts are equalized (operators equilibrium). Then, given xed eet size B and O-D transit demand, under or overcapacity in the system cannot be ruled out a priori. Furthermore, since the fare structure is exogenously given, equilibrium pro ts will be either positive (u > 0), negative (u < 0) or zero (u = 0), depending on the size of B. Speci c values will depend on the magnitude of fares and demand.
The second formulation considers not only the freedom for existing operators to choose the lines they operate, but also free entry and exit from the transit market. The perspective of a positive pro t would attract new operators into the the system, therefore driving bene ts to zero, while negative pro ts would induce some operators to leave, increasing the bene ts of those staying in the system. Consequently, in this case, the equilibrium conditions (7) must hold with u equal to zero.
It is easy to show (Fern andez and Bravo 7] ) that conditions (8) It is interesting to note that the pro t u can be interpreted as the Lagrange multiplier (dual variable) associated with the total eet constraint. Finally we observe that the variational inequality (9) For the second formulation, in which free entry and exit from the transit system is allowed, the total eet constraint has to be dropped. E cient algorithms for solving this equilibrium problem have been proposed and analyzed in Marcotte et al. 16] where (10) is formulated using frequency variables ' l instead of the eet size variables b l .
Bus operators pro t function.
The net pro t obtained by a bus operator will be the consequence of the total income received from fares minus the operating costs incurred. Both revenues and costs are related to the number of round trips made per time unit. Therefore the rst step in de ning a pro t function consists in devising an expression for bus frequencies, considering congestion e ects. Let t l denote the round trip travel time on line l. We can write:
al c a (f a ; ' a ;f a ):
Therefore we can say that t l is a function of the entire frequency vector, i.e.: t l = t l ( ) where = f' l g l2L . The frequency on line l will be given by:
Consequently the frequency vector will be a solution to the xed point problem:
with H de ned as the vector fh l g l2L .
Recalling thatf l denotes the total number of passengers boarding line l per unit of time, and assuming that the fare (by trip) is constant on all lines and has value , then the net pro t obtained by any vehicle operating on line l, per time unit, is given by: l (B; F ) = ( f l =b l ) ? ( X a2A al g a )=t l ? F C l ; (14) where F C l denotes the xed cost of operating a vehicle on line l, per unit of time. This expression can be somewhat simpli ed if we assume that the variable operating cost g a is proportional to the time spent on the network, i.e. that increased fuel consumption due to heavier tra c depends linearly on the time spent on route l, and not the distance travelled. Such a relationship has been proven for the case of cars in city tra c by Evans et al 5] and Evans and Herman 6] . In this case the variable operating cost per round trip g l is proportional to the round trip travel time t l , i.e.: g l = k t l for some positive constant k and the expression of the pro t function reduces to:
Transit vehicles capacities.
It is worth noticing that we have not explicitly included bus capacity constraints in formulations (9), (10) and (11) . Such constraints would impose a practical lower bound on the number of buses b l required to provide a level of service compatible with the demand obtained from the users equilibrium submodel.
Given that a transit line consists of several line segments (line portions between two adjacent transit stops) and that each segment is allowed to carry di erent loads (given by the line load pro le), explicit capacity constraints would force operators to provide a minimum frequency, high enough to carry all passengers traveling on the most congested segment. If the line load pro le is irregular, with only a few heavily congested segments, providing a level of service compatible with the demand will result in a non-pro table operation. Of course the operator of such a line could decide not to provide service to some of the users coming from the heavily loaded segments, forcing some passengers to use alternative lines or to switch modes, whenever possible. On the other hand, ignoring vehicle capacity constraints clearly overestimates operators revenues by including in the operators revenues those fares coming from virtual clients that could not physically board the vehicle.
As any model, ours is a simpli cation of reality. In our view, the correct modeling of bus capacities can only be fully realized in a dynamic setting, taking into account transient overload of the system. In a static, steady-state model (such as ours), we have to assume that no overloading takes place. It is true that some approaches have been made to alleviate the problem of overestimation of boardings resulting from limited bus capacities (see De Cea and Fern andez 4] for instance), but these can only be partial remedies.
We believe that, as is the case for the tra c assignment problem, static models can still provide valuable information.
3. Solution approaches.
Finding the users-operators equilibrium.
We will now present two solution approaches for the transit market equilibrium problem (TMEP) formulated in section 4. As was mentioned in section 3, the TMEP structure corresponds to an extension of a non cooperative game between two systems of players. Transit operators strive to maximize their operating pro ts, which are a ected by the behaviour of system users, and commuters are bound by the decisions of the transit operators, minimizing their objective (time) accordingly.
Given that the equilibrium conditions of the system users can also be expressed using the variational inequality formalism, the combined users-operators problem can be expressed as the system of variational inequalities: where ? denotes the set of feasible ow patterns, i.e. the set of nonnegative vectors satisfying ow conservation and demand. This system can be solved by means of iterative methods such as the block-Jacobi or block-Gauss-Seidel schemes, where, at each iteration, an equilibrium problem involving one group of players (users or operators) is solved, given that the \strategy" of the other group is temporarily xed to its previous value. The iterative process is stopped when both equilibria are consistent. The Gauss-Seidel scheme possesses the advantage of using the latest information available, and will generally be preferred.
Let (B k ; F k ) denote the solution at iteration k. The next iterate is de ned as a solution to the pair of variational inequalities:
(B k+1 ; F k )(B k+1 ? B) 0 8B 2 C(B k+1 ; F k+1 )(F k+1 ? F ) 0 8F 2 : Given that e cient algorithms exist for the resolution of the passengers assignment problem (see Florian and Spiess 9]) we will focus on solution approaches to the operators equilibrium problem.
Since a block Gauss-Seidel iterative algorithm will be used to solve the system of variational inequalities (16) , some information has to be transferred between the subsystems, at each iteration. This information will describe the transitory equilibrium reached by the last subsystem, given the current state of the other subsystem. A passenger equilibrium is described in terms of equilibrium ows, observed over the current transit network. This information is then used to calculate operators pro ts in equation (14) .
In the following section we present two di erent approaches to obtain an equilibrium for the operators subsystem. They di er in the information structure transferred from the passengers subsystem and in the way this information is utilized to compute operators pro ts.
First approach.
In this solution approach the information that is transferred from the passengers to the operators subsystem, at each iteration, corresponds to passenger loads observed on each line at that precise instant. Vehicles will be assigned to the di erent transit lines, striving for equal pro ts on all lines served, based on pro ts calculated using the current information about passenger loads. Therefore the consequences of the changes in boardings resulting from frequency changes are not anticipated by the bus operators. They will only be taken into account at the next iteration, after a new passenger equilibrium has been computed.
Consequently, at each iteration, the operator equilibrium problem is solved using pro t function formulation (14) or (15), withf l xed and equal to the total number of transit users assigned to line l, at the previous iteration of the passengers equilibrium model. Thenf l will be equal to:
where thef l ij 's are constant and obtained from the last transit assignment performed.
This algorithmic approach has the limitation that if no passenger is assigned to a line at some iteration of the iterative procedure, then no vehicles will be assigned at any of the subsequent iterations, given that operators react only to observed (not predicted) ows. Therefore, in order that the procedure works properly it is necessary (but not always su cient) to start from a point in for which b l is strictly positive, for every line l in L. Otherwise some lines might be abandoned at the beginning of the algorithmic process, a line being dropped as soon as a zero frequency is assigned to it. This can be the consequence of a zero load assigned at the previous iteration of the users submodel, or of the line being non-pro table, even though some (small) demand for the service might still exist. This will occur when revenues are not high enough to cover xed costs and operating costs.
Second approach.
This approach tries to circumvent the limitations of the previous decomposition scheme. It uses a more sophisticated algorithm that is based on the fact that in a transit assignment model the set of attractive lines between each pair of nodes of the transit network represent the primary variables, from which ows can be easily deduced. We will therefore assume that bus operators take into account the consequences of competition between common lines belonging to the same set of attractive lines, i.e. that they anticipate the changes in passenger loads resulting from changes in frequencies.
Let us denote by U ij the set of transit lines attractive to passengers boarding at node i and having nal destination, or transferring at, node j, i.e. those passengers that will board the rst incoming bus belonging to the set of lines U ij (this set is a byproduct of the transit assignment model). Given the probabilistic assumptions underlying the transit assignment model (exponential headways for buses), the expected number of boardings will be proportional to frequencies on attractive lines. This statement will hold true until the set U ij changes, due to signi cant changes in bus frequencies or headways; for instance, if frequency on the quickest route becomes very high, then the set of attractive lines will eventually shrink to that single line. Broadly speaking, when the actual frequencies are input back into the transit assignment model, this might lead to changes in the sets U ij .
In this algorithm, the pro t function for the operators subproblem (14) or (15) will be given using the following expression forf l : (17) where, at the current iteration, f ij represents the total number of transit passengers with destination j boarding any line of the set U ij . It is important to observe that l = 2 U ij implies thatf l = 0. In this algorithmic approach, the data U ij and f ij are held xed within an iteration. A fundamental feature of this formulation is that, although a line may be assigned a zero frequency at a given iteration, its frequency can be raised at a positive value at a later iteration. Assume for instance that the quickest line between an origin and a destination has been assigned zero frequency at the start of the calculations. Although the ow on this line will be zero at the rst iteration, it will nevertheless be part of the set of attractive lines connecting the given O-D pair, and will obviously be reactivated at the next iteration, if the expected (non zero) demand is su cient to yield nonnegative pro ts on this line.
It is straightforward to see that both approaches will yield equivalent solutions if the respective sets of lines with nonzero frequencies are the same. Otherwise it might be that the solutions di er. An example illustrating the behaviour of both algorithms on a small example is worked out in detail in the Appendix.
Implementation.
The rst approach is obviously the easiest to implement, not requiring information about passengers strategies. However it su ers two drawbacks:
(i) it can be stuck in a solution that does not have the right set of active lines (lines with nonzero frequencies) (ii) since less information is taken into account in the operators subproblem ( rst approach) it is expected that global convergence of the algorithm could be slow and, in some extreme cases, the algorithm could cycle. An application of the model requires data similar to that required for a traditional transit equilibrium model: origin-destination matrices T and T for private and public transport respectively; speci cation of an infrastructure network G = (N; A) and a transit network G = (N ; L), including arc performance functions c a (f a ; ' a ;f a ) and c a (f a ; a ;f a ). If modal split is to be included then a calibrated modal split model of the logit form is also required (see Florian and Spiess 9] ). In this latter case, only a joint private-public O/D matrix is required.
Additional information that must be provided concerns the parameters of the pro t functions l (B; F ) for the bus operators, including operating cost functions g a (f a ; a ;f a ) and xed costs F C l . In order to calibrate those cost functions, information from the bus operators is necessary. Such functions are currently being calibrated for the case of the city of Santiago, Chile. The model presented here will be used as part of a set of planning tools to predict the future behavior of bus operators and the supply of transit services corresponding to various system development scenarios. 5 . Existence, uniqueness and convergence.
The existence of at least one equilibrium solution to the combined usersoperators model follows, by a xed point theorem, from the compactness of the set of feasible solutions and the continuity of the functions involved. The former condition is automatically satis ed since demand is assumed exogenous and arbitrarily large frequencies would yield, in the free entry case, negative pro ts, clearly a non-equilibrium situation. The continuity issue is more sensitive. Indeed the cost function is not continuous for ' l = 0. However it is possible (see Marcotte and Blain 15] ) to make the function l (B; F ) continuous at the origin by showing that the ratiosf l =b l can be bounded by constants K l dependent solely on the problem parameters.
Uniqueness of the equilibrium solution, even under \reasonable" assumptions, could not be proved. The equilibrium set, as exampli ed in the Appendix (see also Marcotte and Blain 15]), can be stable, unstable or even disconnected. Part of the problem is due to the inability of the model to distinguish between perfectly matched lines composed of identical sequences of arcs, stops, transfer nodes. Whereas uniqueness results based on strict monotonicity arguments can be obtained for the passengers submodel as well the operators submodel, this is not the case for the combined model, although partial results could be obtained in the free entry case, under fairly weak assumptions. It must be reminded however that strict monotonicity, which does not prevail here, is a su cient but not necessary condition for uniqueness of the equibrium solution.
Theoretical conditions for convergence of our algorithms is di cult to establish using standard arguments (the mappings involved are not monotone). Another potential di culty in analyzing the convergence process comes from the fact that, in the users phase, linear programs are being solved, and hence only extremal solutions are generated. However, we could not prove formally that equilibrium solutions corresponding to extremal user solutions exist (this is not guaranteed by the xed point theorem invoked earlier). To be more precise, let us rewrite equation (16b) to emphasize the role of users strategies (or set of attractive lines U ij ) as primary decision variables. We obtain: C(B ; F (S ))(F(S ) ? F (S)) 0 8S 2 where denotes the set of admissible strategies and F (S) the ow-strategy relationship. This variational inequality can be rewritten as: C 0 (B ; S )(S ? S) 0 8S 2 where C 0 (B; S) def = C(B; F (S)). In both iterative schemes, only the discrete set corresponding to the extreme points of is considered, corresponding, in the game-theoretic sense, to pure strategies. We conjecture that, in the abscence of user-induced congestion, there exist at least one pure-strategy equilibrium. Indeed this would make sense since a high load on a line will result in a higher frequency, and reciprocally. 6 . Alternative formulations of the operators market.
Alternative formulation of the operators equilibrium problem can be obtained if di erent market conditions are assumed. If we assume that only one private operator controls the whole transit system, it will behave as a monopoly trying to maximize total pro t generated by the transit system operation. In such case an equilibrium solution will be obtained by solving the following bilevel programming problem: max B;F (B; F ) s.t. F : a bimodal equilibrium b l 0 8l 2 L (20) where represents the sum of the pro ts for all lines and vehicles in the system. Pro ts per vehicle are still given by expression (14) . Problem (20) can be solved using an approach similar to the one use in section 5, based on the following basic economic observation: In order that the total pro t over the entire system be maximized, all lines should yield equal marginal bene ts. Therefore conditions (8) , (9) and (10) can be reformulated in terms of marginal instead of average pro ts, and similar solution algorithms can be implemented.
When in (20) represents social bene t instead of private pro ts, then the problem corresponds to what is now commonly called a bilevel programming problem (Bard and Falk 2]), or, in this particular case, a transit design problem (see Fern andez 8] ). Although this is considered to be a di cult problem in its general form, e cient heuristic have been devised to solve particular instances, such as the equilibrium network design (see Marcotte 14] ).
An alternative formulation is obtained if we assume that each line l 2 L is operated by a single transit rm. Then, in the operators subsystem, there will be as many players as lines operated. Each player will strive to maximize its own total bene t, without explicit knowledge of the other players pro t functions. An equilibrium will be reached when each player is at a maximum, given the current decisions of all other players. An equilibrium solution can be computed by simultaneously solving all operators optimization problems for a Nash equilibrium (see Friedman 10] For the solution of this problem the Jacobi iterative scheme seems appropriate. At each iteration, players maximize their own pro ts given the other players decision at the previous iteration.
